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Since the Snowden revelations, the adoption in May 2016 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation and several ground-breaking judgments of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, data protection and 
privacy are high on the agenda of policymakers, industries and the 
legal research community. 
Against this backdrop, Data Protection and Privacy under Pressure 
sheds light on key developments where individuals’ rights to data 
protection and privacy are at stake. The book discusses the persistent 
transatlantic tensions around various EU-US data transfer mechanisms 
and EU jurisdiction claims over non-EU-based companies, both sparked 
by milestone court cases. Additionally, it scrutinises the expanding 
control or surveillance mechanisms and interconnection of databases in 
the areas of migration control, internal security and law enforcement, 
and oversight thereon. Finally, it explores current and future legal 
challenges related to big data and automated decision-making in the 
contexts of policing, pharmaceutics and advertising. 
Gert Vermeulen is full professor of international and European criminal 
law and director of the Institute for International Research on Criminal 
Policy (IRCP) at Ghent University, and privacy commissioner at the 
Belgian DPA.
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Eyes wide shut 
The Privacy Shield’s blunt denial of continued bulk, mass 
or indiscriminate collection or processing and unneces-
sary or disproportionate access and use by US intelligence 
and law enforcement authorities  
GERT VERMEULEN1  
 INADEQUACY OF THE US DATA PROTECTION REGIME: 
CLEAR SINCE 9/11, CLEARER SINCE SNOWDEN  
The Europol-US agreement of 20 December 20022 and the EU-US mutual as-
sistance treaty in criminal matters of 25 June 20033, both concluded in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, soon set the tone, in that US non-compliance 
with key EU data protection standards was set aside in favour of enabling EU-
US data flows after all.  
 
                                                                  
1 Full Professor of International and European Criminal Law, Director Institute for In-
ternational Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP), Department Chair Criminology, Crim-
inal Law and Social Law, Faculty of Law, Ghent University; Privacy Commissioner, 
Commission for the Protection of Privacy (Belgium). Email: gert.vermeulen@ugent.be. 
This text is an updated and elaborate version of Gert Vermeulen, ‘The Paper Shield. 
On the degree of protection of the EU-US privacy shield against unnecessary or dis-
proportionate data collection by the US intelligence and law enforcement services’ in 
Dan JB Svantesson and Dariusz Kloza (eds), Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Relations as a 
Challenge for Democracy (European Integration and Democracy Series, vol 4, Intersen-
tia 2017). 
2 Supplemental agreement on the exchange of personal data and related information 
(Europol Police Office-United States of America) (20 December 2002) <https://www. 
europol.europa.eu/content/supplemental-agreement-between-europol-police-office 
-and-united-states-america> 
3 Agreement on mutual legal assistance (European Union-United States of America) 




Neither in terms of police or judicial cooperation the adequacy of the US data 
protection level could be established, whilst both the (then) Europol-Agree-
ment and Directive 95/464 required so. Purpose limitation (specialty)5 in the 
use of data provided by Europol or EU Member States proved an almost nu-
gatory concept, where the US was allowed to freely make use of information 
that was procured in criminal cases for purely administrative or intelligence 
purposes.6 Later, in 2006, it was revealed that the US Treasury had procured 
access to worldwide scriptural bank transactions by means of administrative 
subpoenas vis-à-vis the US hub of the (Belgium-based) Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) in the context of combating 
the financing of terrorism, but surely alluding to other (including economic) 
goals as well.7 Moreover, SWIFT itself defected herein, as its US hub did not 
endorse the so-called Safe Harbour principles.8 These had been developed in 
2000 by the European Commission9 to ensure that, given that the US data 
                                                                  
4 Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 
281/31. 
5 Els De Busser, ‘Purpose limitation in EU-US data exchange in criminal matters: the 
remains of the day’ in Marc Cools and others (eds), Readings on criminal justice, crim-
inal law and policing (Vol 2, Maklu 2009) 163. 
6 Steve Peers, ‘The  exchange  of  personal  data  between  Europol  and  the  USA’ 
(2003) Statewatch Analysis no 15 <www.statewatch.org>; Gert Vermeulen, ‘Transat-
lantisch monsterverbond of verstandshuwelijk? Over het verschil tussen oorlog en ju-
ridische strijd tegen terreur en de versterkte politie- en justitiesamenwerking tussen 
EU en VS’ (2004) 25(1) Panopticon 90; Paul De Hert and Bart De Schutter, ‘Interna-
tional Transfers of Data in the Field of JHA: The Lessons of Europol, PNR and Swift’ in 
Bernd Martenczuk and Servaas Van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty, Security: New Chal-
lenges for EU External Relations (I.E.S. series nr. 11, VUB Press 2008) 326-327 and 329-
333. 
7 See Belgian Privacy Commission, ‘Opinion on the Transfer of Personal Data by the 
CSLR SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC)’ 37/2006 <https://www.privacycommission.be 
/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/advies_37_2006_1.pdf>; Also: Patrick M 
Connorton, ‘Tracking Terrorist Financing through SWIFT: When U.S. subpoenas and 
foreign privacy law collide’ (2007) 76(1) Fordham L Rev 283.  
8 Gloria González Fuster, Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘SWIFT and the vulnerabil-
ity of transatlantic data transfers’ (2008) 22(1-2) Intl Rev of L Computers & Technol-
ogy 191. 
9 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection pro-
vided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions 
issued by the US Department of Commerce [2000] OJ L 215/7. 
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protection regime in itself could not be qualified as adequate, commercial EU-
US data transfers would nonetheless be enabled.10 Companies that indicated 
(and self-certified) their compliance with the principles laid down in the 
Commission’s Safe Harbour Decision, were to be considered as – from a data 
protection perspective – ‘safe harbours’ within US territory, to which EU com-
panies were allowed to transfer data. This, however, was not the case for the 
SWIFT hub in the US, so that the Belgian company should have refrained from 
localizing (backup) data in it. The EU’s response to this scandal was far from 
convincing. While intra-European payment transactions were admittedly no 
longer sent to the US hub (albeit that in the meantime SWIFT had registered 
it as a ‘safe harbour’), the Commission negotiated on behalf of the EU an 
agreement with the US, allowing the latter, via a Europol ‘filter’ (which pain-
fully lacks proper filtering capacity) to obtain bulk-access on a case-by-case 
basis to these intra-European payment transactions. This 2010 TFTP-agree-
ment (Terrorist Financing Tracking Program11) furthermore contains an arti-
cle in which the US Treasury is axiomatically deemed adequate in terms of 
data protection. 12  Notwithstanding this, and given the known practice of 
wide data-sharing between US government administrations and bodies con-
trary to the European purpose-limitation principle, the inadequacy of the US 
data protection regime was at the time beyond doubt. That the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act (FISA)13, amended post-9/11 with the Patriot Act14 
and further expanded in 200815 (FISA Amendments Act), allowed the US to 
monitor – either with or without a court order – electronic communication in 
                                                                  
10 See William J Long and Marc Pang Quek, ‘Personal data privacy protection in an age 
of globalization: the US-EU safe harbor compromise’ (2002) 9(3) JEPP 325. 
11Agreement on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the Eu-
ropean Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Pro-
gram (European Union–United States of America) (30 November 2009) OJ L 008/11. 
12 Article 6 of the TFTP Agreement (n 11) reads: “ […] the U.S. Treasury Department is 
deemed to ensure an adequate level of data protection for the processing of financial 
payment messaging and related data transferred from the European Union to the 
United States for purposes of this Agreement.” 
13 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 50 USC §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 1841-
46, 1861-62, 1871. 
14 Uniting and Strengthening America by providing appropriate tools required to in-
tercept and obstruct terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001; Paul T Jaeger, John Carlo 
Bertot and Charles R McClure, ‘The  impact  of  the  USA Patriot Act on collection and 
analysis of personal information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’ 
(2003) 20 Government Information Quarterly 295. 




a way that was disproportionate, worldwide and in bulk, was clear as well.16 
This and more was confirmed in the summer of 2013 with the revelations of 
whistleblower Edward Snowden. 17  These revelations were particularly 
shocking because of the revealed extent of the interception practices of the 
NSA (National Security Agency) – inter alia through the PRISM and Upstream 
programmes – and the British intelligence service GCHQ’s (Government Com-
munications Headquarters)18 – which for years had spied on Belgacom Inter-
national Carrier Service (Bics). As a subsidiary of Belgium-based (tele)com-
munications provider Proximus, Bics provides worldwide hardware through 
which telecom companies and government agencies run their electronic com-
munication (internet-, telephony-, mobile- and texting-traffic). Moreover, the 
intense mutual cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ, and within the so-
called Five Eyes Community (comprising the intelligence services of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand), was confirmed by the revelations, although 
many were well aware that these five, within the context of Echelon, had been 
monitoring worldwide satellite communications for decades, including for 
commercial purposes. Already in 2000, the European Parliament had insti-
gated an investigative commission against these practices. 19 From the US 
                                                                  
16 Els De Busser, ‘Purpose limitation in EU-US data exchange in criminal matters: the 
remains of the day’ in Marc Cools and others (eds), Readings on criminal justice, crim-
inal law and policing (Vol 2, Maklu 2009) 163; Els De Busser, Data Protection in EU and 
US Criminal Cooperation (Maklu 2009). 
17 The outrage broke in June 2013, when the Guardian first reported that the US Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) was collecting the telephone records of tens of millions 
of Americans, see: Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA collecting phone records of millions of Ver-
izon customers daily’ The Guardian (London, 6 June 2013) <http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>; Also: Mary-
Rose Papandrea, ‘Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the 
First Amendment’ (2014) 94(2) Boston U L Rev 449. 
18 The involvement of the British GCHQ was revealed by the Guardian on the 21st of 
June, 2013. See: Ewen MacAskill and others, ‘GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret 
access to world's communications’ The Guardian, (London, 21 June 2013) <http:// 
www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communica-
tions-nsa>. 
19 See European Parliament decision setting up a temporary committee on the ECHE-
LON interception system, 29 June 2000 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get-
Doc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B5-2000-0593&language=EN> and the final re-
port that was published in 2001: Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception 
System, ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and 
commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’ FI-
NAL A5-0264/2001 PAR1, 11 July 2001. See also: Franco Piodi and Lolanda Mombelli, 
‘The ECHELON Affair. The European Parliament and the Global Interception System 
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side, the publication of NSA-newsletters in the summer of 2015 as a result of 
the Snowden revelations, plainly confirmed these allegations.20 
 SAFE HARBOUR DEAD  
Using the leverage handed to her under the Lisbon Treaty21, the then Com-
missioner of Justice Reding launched an ambitious legislative data protection 
package at the outset of 2012.22 A proposed regulation was initiated to re-
place Directive 95/4623 , and aimed inter alia to bind (US) service providers 
on EU territory by European rules on data protection. In parallel, a proposed 
directive had to upgrade the 2008 Framework Decision on data protection in 
the sphere of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.24 In Decem-
                                                                  
1998 – 2002’ (2014) European Parliament History Series <http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/EPRS/EPRS_STUDY_538877_AffaireEchelon-EN.pdf>. 
20 See Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, ‘Transatlantic Data War. Europe fights 
back against the NSA’ (2016) 95(1) Foreign Affairs 124. 
21 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community (adopted 17 December 2007) OJ 2007/C 306/01. 
22 Viviane Reding, ‘The European  data protection framework for the twenty-first cen-
tury’ (2012) 2(3) International Data Privacy Law 119; Commission, 'Safeguarding Pri-
vacy in a Connected World -A European Data Protection  Framework  for  the  21st  
Century’ (Communication) COM (2012)  9  final. 
23 Colin J Bennet and Charles D Raab, ‘The Adequacy  of  Privacy:  the  European  Union  
Data Protection Directive and the North American Response’ (1997) 13 The Infor-
mation Society 245, 252. 
24 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protec-
tion of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters [2008] OJ L 350/60; See also: Els De Busser and Gert Vermeulen, 
‘Towards a coherent EU policy on outgoing data transfers for use in criminal matters? 
The adequacy requirement and the framework decision on data protection in criminal 
matters. A transatlantic exercise in adequacy’ in Marc Cools and others (eds), EU and 




ber 2015 political agreement was reached on the new Regulation and the Di-
rective.25 Both of them were formally adopted in April 201626 and EU Mem-
ber States are due to apply them from 25 respectively 6 May 2018 onwards. 
The adequacy requirement for data transfers to third states moreover re-
mains intact. Reding also took up the defense for EU citizens for what con-
cerns US access to their personal data.27 Just a few months after the Snowden 
revelations, she came up with two parallel communications at the end of No-
vember 2013: ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows’ (COM(2013) 846 fi-
nal)28 and ‘communication on the functioning of the Safe Harbour from the 
perspective of EU citizens and companies established in the EU’ (COM(2013) 
847 final)29 (hereafter: Safe Harbour communication). The first communica-
tion was accompanied by a report containing the 'findings on the ad-hoc 
workgroup data protection of the EU and the US'30, which, among others, stip-
ulated that the improvements in the Safe Harbour Decision should address 
the 'structural deficiencies in relation to the transparency and enforcement, 
the material safe harbour principles and the functioning of the exception for 
                                                                  
25 For an overview of the route leading up to these instruments, see the (then: 2004-
2014) European Data  Protection  Supervisor’s overview:  Peter Hustinx, ‘EU Data Pro-
tection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data Pro-
tection Regulation’ (2015) <https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site 
/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2014/14-09-15_Arti-
cle_EUI_EN.pdf>. 
26 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 
119/1; Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the pur-
poses of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L 119/89. 
27 See Els De Busser, ‘Privatization of Information and the Data Protection Reform’ in 
Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), Reloading Data Protection (Springer 2014).  
28 Commission, ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows’ (Communication) COM(2013) 
846 final. 
29 Commission, ‘Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Per-
spective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU’ (Communication) 
COM(2013) 847 final.  
30 Report of 27 November 2013 on the Findings by the EU Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-
US Working Group on Data Protection [2013] <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-pro-
tection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protec-
tion.pdf>. 
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national security’.31 After all, the Safe Harbour Decision explicitly determined 
that the demands of ‘national security, public interest and law enforcement’ 
of the US supersede the Safe Harbour principles.32 As it turned out, these ex-
ceptions rendered the safe harbours unsafe. In its 2013 Safe Harbour com-
munication, the Commission established that ‘all companies  involved in the 
PRISM-programme, and which grant access to US authorities to data stored 
and processed in the US, appear  to  be  Safe  Harbour  certified.’ As such, ‘[t]his 
has made the Safe Harbour scheme one of the conduits through which access 
is given to US intelligence authorities to collecting  personal data initially pro-
cessed in the EU’ (point 7). This was indeed the case: Microsoft, Google, Face-
book, Apple, Yahoo!, Skype, YouTube … all of them were self-certified under 
Safe Harbour and simultaneously involved in the PRISM-programme. The 
Commission concluded that ‘[t]he large scale nature of these programmes 
may [have] result[ed] in [more] data transferred under Safe Harbour being 
accessed  and  further processed by US authorities beyond what is strictly nec-
essary and proportionate to the protection of national security as foreseen un-
der the exception provided in the Safe Harbour Decision’.33 
Real urgency in the negotiations with the US only (re)surfaced following the 
ruling of the CJEU on 6 October 2015 in response to the appeal of Max Schrems 
against the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (in proceedings against Face-
book34, that has its European headquarters in Dublin) before the Irish High 
Court.35 The latter had requested a preliminary ruling by the CJEU, namely as 
to whether the Irish privacy commissioner (as it had itself upheld) was bound 
by the Safe Harbour Decision of the Commission to the extent that it could no 
longer be questioned whether the US data protection regime was adequate, 
as such leading the Irish privacy commissioner to conclude that it could not 
investigate the complaint filed by Schrems. The latter had argued the con-
trary, based on the post-Snowden ascertainment that Facebook was active in 
the PRISM-programme, regardless of its self-certification under the Safe Har-
bour principles.36 The CJEU concluded inter alia that ‘[t]he right to respect for 
                                                                  
31 Emphasis added. 
32 See Annex I, para 4. 
33 Safe Harbour Communication (n 29) point 7.1. (emphasis added). 
34 Natasha Simmons, ‘Facebook and the Privacy Frontier’ (2012) 33(3) JBL 58. 
35 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner EU:C:2015: 
650. 
36 Andreas Kirchner, ‘Reflections on privacy in the age of global electronic data pro-
cessing with a focus on data processing practices of facebook’ (2012) 6(1) Masaryk 




private life, guaranteed by article 7 of the Charter and by the core values com-
mon to the traditions of the Member States, would be rendered meaningless 
if the State authorities were authorised to access electronic communications 
on a casual and generalised basis without any objective justification based on 
considerations of national security or the prevention of crime that are specific 
to the individual concerned and without those practices being accompanied by 
appropriate and verifiable safeguards’.37 The CJEU furthermore recalled, with 
explicit reference to its Data Retention judgment of 8 April 201438 (in which 
it had declared the Data Retention Directive invalid) and its earlier judgments 
as cited under points 54 & 55 of its Data Retention judgment, its consistent 
case-law that ‘EU legislation involving interference with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by articles 7 and 8 of the Charter [regarding the respect for 
private and family life and the protection of personal data respectively] must, 
according to the Court’s settled case-law, lay down clear and precise rules 
governing the scope and application of a measure […]’.39 Still with reference 
to the Data Retention judgment (and the case-law cited under point 52 
hereof), the CJEU jointly stated that ‘furthermore and above all, protection of 
the fundamental right to respect for private life at EU level requires deroga-
tions and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data to apply 
only in so far as is strictly necessary’40, whereby of course ‘[l]egislation is not 
                                                                  
cyberspace?’ (Inaugural Lecture at Radboud University Nijmegen, 2013) <http:// 
works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/48/>; Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The trouble with 
European data protection law’ (2014) Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Pa-
per Series 04/2015 <http://m.isaca. org/Groups/Professional-English/privacy-data-
protection/GroupDocuments/2014-08-24%20%20The%20Trou-
ble%20with%20European%20Data%20Protection%20 Law.pdf>; Fanny Coudert, 
‘Schrems vs. Data Protection Commissioner: a slap on the wrist for the Commission 
and new powers for data protection authorities’ (European Law Blog 2015) <https:// 
lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/511500/1/FannyCoudert_Post+CJEU+ 
Schrems_final.pdf>; Reid Day, ‘Let the magistrates revolt: A review of search warrant 
applications for electronic in-formation possessed by online services’ (2015) 64(2) U 
Kan L Rev 491; Shane Darcy, ‘Battling for the Rights to Privacy and Data Protection in 
the Irish Courts’ (2015) 31(80) Utrecht J of Intl and Eur L 131; David Flint, ‘Computers 
and internet: Sunk without a trace – the demise of safe harbor’ (2015) 36(6) JBL 236; 
Hannah Crowther, ‘Invalidity  of  the  US  Safe  Harbor  framework: what does it mean?’ 
(2016) 11(2) JIPLP 88; Nora Ni Loideain, ‘The End of Safe Harbor: Implications for EU 
Digital Privacy and Data Protection Law’ (2016) 19(8) J Internet L 7. 
37 Maximillian Schrems (n 34) para 34 (emphasis added). 
38 Joined Cases C 293/12 and C 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland a.o. EU:C:2014:238. 
39 Maximillian Schrems (n 34) para 91 (emphasis added). 
40 ibid, para 92 (emphasis added). 
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limited to what is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a generalised basis, 
storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has been trans-
ferred from the European Union to the United States without any differentia-
tion, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective pursued 
and without an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine the 
limits of the access of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent 
use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying 
the interference which both access to that data and its use entail’.41 In other 
words: collection (storage), access and use for reasons of national security, 
public interest or law enforcement require specific and precise criteria and 
are but allowed when strictly necessary for specific purposes that are strictly 
restricted. Given the fact that the Commission had omitted to implement such 
an assessment in its Safe Harbour Decision, the CJEU decided on the invalidity 
of the latter. Hence, with the Schrems case, the CJEU firmly put the finger on 
the following issue: engagements by US companies through self-certification 
under the Safe Harbour principles do not provide (adequate) protection as 
long as it remains unclear whether, despite large-scale interception pro-
grammes like PRISM, the US privacy regime may be considered adequate. 
With the sudden invalidity of the Safe Harbour Decision, a replacement in-
strument became an urgent necessity. The European Commission (since No-
vember 2014 the Juncker Commission, with Věra Jourová as the Commis-
sioner for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship competent inter alia for 
data protection, under custody of super-commissioner (vice-president of the 
Commission) Frans Timmermans was quick to temper emotions. In a commu-
nication on the very day of the CJEU’s decision, Timmermans recognized the 
Court’s confirmation of the necessity ‘of having robust data protection safe-
guards in place before transferring citizens’ data’. He furthermore added that, 
following its Safe Harbour communication, the Commission was working 
with the US authorities ‘to make data transfers safer for European citizens’ 
and that, in light of the Schrems judgment, it would continue to work ‘towards 
a renewed and safe framework for the transfer of personal data across the 
Atlantic’.42             
  
                                                                  
41 ibid, para 93 (emphasis added). 
42 Commission, ‘Communication on the transfer of personal data from the EU to the 
United States of America under Directive 95/46/EC following the Judgment by the 
Court of Justice in Case C-362/14 (Schrems)’ (Communication) COM(2015) 566 final; 
First Vice-President Timmermans and Commissioner Jourová,  ‘Press conference on 
Safe Harbour following the Court ruling in case C-362/14 (Schrems)’ (Statement Eu-




 LONG LIVE THE PRIVACY SHIELD? TELE2 SVERIGE AB AND 
DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND RESPECTIVELY LA QUADRATURE 
DU NET AND OTHERS V COMMISSION  
On 29 February 2016, the Commission presented its eagerly awaited ‘solu-
tion’. It launched a new communication, ‘Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring 
Trust through Strong Safeguards’43, and immediately attached hereto – in re-
placement of the invalidated Safe Harbour Decision – its draft adequacy deci-
sion44 of the US data protection regime (with 7 annexes) for data transfers 
under the protection of the so-called ‘EU-US Privacy Shield’. On the JHA Coun-
cil the day after, Jourovà hooted: ‘Written assurances regarding the limita-
tions on access to data by US public authorities on national security grounds’. 
Following a negative initial opinion about the initial draft decision, issued by 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on 13 April 2016,45 the Com-
mission had no viable choice but to initiate summary renegotiations with the 
US, leading to just marginal adjustments of the Privacy Shield. The Article 29 
Working Party (having nothing but mere advisory power in the first place) 
gave in,46 as did the Article 31 Committee47 (which did have veto power over 
the draft decision). The revised version of the Privacy Shield adequacy deci-
sion was adopted by the European Commission on 12 July 2016. 
Un-surprisingly, the Privacy Shield is already facing legal challenges before 
the CJEU, following two actions for annulment filed on 16 September and 25 
October 2016 in cases brought by Digital Rights Ireland48  respectively La 
Quadrature du Net and Others49 against the Commission, which the below 
                                                                  
43 Commission, ‘Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust through Strong Safeguards’ 
(Communication) COM(2016) 117 final. 
44 Commission Implementing Decision of xxx pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided 
by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. 
45 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Press release’ (13 April 2016); Article 29 Working Party, 
‘Opinion 01/2016 on the draft EU-U.S. Privacy Shield adequacy decision’ WP 238 (13 
April 2016). 
46 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Press release’ (1 July 2016). 
47 On 8 July 2016, following its non-decision of 19 May on the initial version of the 
Privacy Shield. 
48 Case T-670/16 Digital Rights Ireland v Commission [2016] action brought on Sep-
tember 16, 2016. 
49  Case T-738/16 La Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission [2016] action 
brought on October 25, 2016. 
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analysis will refer to where relevant.50 This will equally be the case for the 
Irish High Court judgment of 3 October 2017 in the case between the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd. and Maximillian 
Schrems, referring the issue of the validity of the Standard Contractual 
Clauses underlying personal data transfers from Facebook Ireland to Face-
book Inc. (US) to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.51 At least indirectly, the 
case surely adds to the pressure on the Privacy Shield as well. Even with over 
2,500 companies52 self-certified under the new scheme, it will likely not sur-
vive infancy.  
This is especially true since the CJEU has issued yet another judgment, on 21 
December 2016, after a request for a preliminary ruling in the case Tele2 Sve-
rige AB,53 on data retention under the ePrivacy Directive. As will be explained 
in the analysis below, the findings of the CJEU at least indirectly place a bomb 
under the Privacy Shield as well, where it holds that ‘general and indiscrimi-
nate retention of traffic data and location data’ is inacceptable, leaving Mem-
ber States the possibility for only ‘targeted’54 retention of traffic and location 
data, meaning that such retention must then be defined also in terms of the 
‘public […] that may potentially be affected’55 and on the basis of ‘objective 
evidence which makes it possible to identify a public whose data is likely to 
reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal offences, and to 
contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to preventing a 
serious risk to public security’56. Indiscriminate data collection, irrespective 
of later access or use restrictions, has been formally invalidated by the CJEU, 
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even in a clearer fashion than in its 2014 Data Retention judgment. Interest-
ingly, it has moreover explicitly ruled that data concerned must be retained 
within the European Union, which indirectly raises fresh doubts about the le-
gitimacy of transferring (electronic communications) data under the Privacy 
Shield, and even under the Umbrella Agreement or the TFTP. 
Before evaluating the Privacy Shield on its merits, it pays to bear in mind that, 
conceptually, it bears a very strong resemblance with the Safe Harbour re-
gime. The Safe Harbour principles have now been renamed as privacy princi-
ples, which should serve as the new basis for data transfers coming from the 
EU to organizations – essentially: corporations – in the US who endorse these 
principles through the act of self-certification. Mirroring the Safe Harbour De-
cision, there is furthermore a general exception hereto should national secu-
rity, public interest or law enforcement require so. Hence, the central ques-
tion is whether the ‘limitations’ and ‘safeguards’ that are presented by the 
Privacy Shield – the Safe Harbour regime did not foresee any of these – are 
convincing enough. The way in which the European Commission desperately 
tried to convince everyone, through the means of its communication and the 
attached (draft) adequacy decision, of the satisfactory nature of the new re-
gime, and that the US will effectively display an adequate data protection level 
under the Privacy Shield, is painful to witness. The heydays of former Euro-
pean justice commissioner Reding seem long gone. Apparently, demanding a 
genuine commitment of the US to refrain from collecting in bulk personal data 
of EU citizens or coming from the EU, and to only intercept communications 
and other personal data when strictly necessary and proportionate, was a po-
litical bridge too far. It seems that Commissioner Jourová (and super-commis-
sioner Timmermans) have succumbed to the dominant importance of main-
taining benevolent trans-Atlantic trade relations. Allowing trans-Atlantic 
transfers of personal data from companies or their subsidiaries in the EU to 
companies based in the US is after all the primordial goal of the Privacy Shield. 
Tough negotiating was apparently not considered an option, not even in the 
renegotiation stage. Nonetheless, one fails to see why such a commercial 
transfer of personal data without the option to do so in bulk, or without re-
sorting to a capturing of such data that is disproportionate for intelligence or 
law enforcement purposes, would have been too high of a stake during nego-
tiations. Companies - including the major US players like Google, Apple, Face-
book and Microsoft - will in the long run not benefit from the fact that they will 
not be able to protect the data of their European or other users against gov-
ernment access. It is regrettable that they themselves seem insufficiently 
aware of this, leaving aside scarce counter-examples like the Apple-FBI 
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clash.57 In the meantime, the very minimum is to burst the bubble of the Eu-
ropean Commission's discourse in the privacy shield communication and its 
(draft) adequacy decision. The 'limitations' and 'safeguards' that the shield - 
according to the Commission - offers against US data collection in the interest 
of national security (by the intelligence services), public interest or law en-
forcement (by the police) are by absolutely no means sufficient. A simple fo-
cused reading and concise analysis hereof suffice to demonstrate this.               
 DATA COLLECTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES  
 Amalgamation of collection and access v access and use 
The Commission’s analysis is misleading because it repeatedly posits that the 
'limitations' to which the US will commit and that are applicable on the parts 
concerning 'access' and 'use'58 for the purpose of national security, public in-
terest or law enforcement, will be sufficient in light of EU law to amount to an 
adequate level of data protection. According to EU law, however, processing 
of personal data takes place as soon as 'collection' takes place, regardless of 
any future 'access' to this data or the 'use' thereof. By systematically wielding 
the term 'access' instead of 'collection', or by posing as if the limitations re-
garding 'access' will - with the proverbial single stroke of a brush - also in-
clude sufficient limitations in terms of 'collection', the Commission is wilfully 
pulling one’s leg. To the extent still necessary, it suffices to recall the previ-
ously mentioned 2014 Data Retention judgment of the CJEU. In the latter, the 
Court abundantly made clear that limitations are necessary both in the phase 
of the 'collection' of personal data (in casu retention or conservation by sup-
pliers of electronic communication services of traffic data in fixed and mobile 
telephony, internet access, internet e-mail and internet telephony) as in the 
phases of 'accessing' this data or its later 'use' (in casu by the competent po-
lice and judicial authorities). As such, the Commission skips a step, or at least 
tries to maintain the illusion that the Privacy Shield's limitations in terms of 
'access' and 'use' will suffice to speak of an adequate data protection. This, 
however, is a flagrantly false rhetoric. Just the same, also the part that con-
cerns the initial 'collection' of personal data by the competent authorities (in 
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casu the US intelligence or law enforcement services) is bound by strict re-
quirements. After all, one of the reasons why the CJEU dismissed the Data Re-
tention Directive as invalid59 was because 'in particular, it is not restricted to 
a retention in relation (i) to data pertaining to a particular time period and/or 
a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular persons likely 
to be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons 
who could, for other reasons, contribute, by the retention of their data, to the 
prevention, detection or prosecution of serious offences'. It is important to 
bear in mind that back then, the debate was only on the conservation (and as 
such 'collection') by service providers of electronic communications, and not 
even on the direct 'collection' by intelligence and law enforcement services 
themselves, as is currently the case with the Privacy Shield.  
With the CJEU judgment in Tele2 Sverige AB of December 2016, there is no 
doubt left that any preventative data retention must be ‘limited […] to what 
is strictly necessary’, ‘with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the 
means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention 
period adopted’,60 these limitation criteria being explicitly cumulative, whilst 
the initial Data Retention judgment of 2014 (by the use of ‘and/or’) still left 
the door open for data retention which would not be targeted in terms of the 
‘persons concerned’ or the ‘public affected’. 
Apart from this, the CJEU, in its 2014 Data Retention judgment, argued that in 
the Data Retention Directive '[there is] not only […] a general absence of lim-
its’, and that ‘[it] also fails to lay down any objective criterion by which to 
determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the 
data and their subsequent use for the purposes of prevention, detection or 
criminal prosecutions concerning offences that, in view of the extent and se-
riousness of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in arti-
cles 7 and 8 of the Charter, may be considered to be sufficiently serious to 
justify such an interference'.61 The Court continued that the 'Directive does 
not contain substantive and procedural conditions relating to the access of 
the competent national authorities to the data and to their subsequent use. 
Article 4 of the directive, which governs the access of those authorities to the 
data retained, does not expressly provide that that access and the subsequent 
use of the data in question must be strictly restricted to the purpose of pre-
venting and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conducting 
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criminal prosecutions relating thereto; it merely provides that each Member 
State is to define the procedures to be followed and the conditions to be ful-
filled in order to gain access to the retained data in accordance with necessity 
and proportionality requirements'.62 Ultimately, and still with reference to 
'access' and 'use', the Court lamented  that the Directive 'does not lay down 
any objective criterion by which the number of persons authorised to access 
and subsequently use the data retained is limited to what is strictly necessary 
in the light of the objective pursued' and that '[a]bove all, the access by the 
competent national authorities to the data retained is not made dependent 
on a prior review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative 
body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is 
strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and 
which intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted 
within the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal 
prosecutions. Nor does it lay down a specific obligation on Member States de-
signed to establish such limits'.63 Mutatus mutandis64 both the necessity and 
proportionality requirements can be firmly derived from the Data Retention 
judgment, and this with regards to the 'collection' of data on the one hand, 
and the 'access' to and 'use' of this data on the other. It was (as a minimum) 
to be expected from the Commission's Privacy Shield-communication that it 
would, for the discerned phases of 'collection' and 'access and use' respec-
tively, carefully and systematically inquire into the US-proposed 'limitations' 
to its processing of and interference with EU personal data, drawing on the 
EU privacy requirements like these had been operationalized by the CJEU in 
its 2014 Data Retention judgment. Unfortunately, The privacy Shield Commu-
nications does not do so. From a substantive perspective, it is moreover the 
case that the guarantees in terms of 'collection' are clearly insufficient, since 
eg bulk collection of data remains perfectly possible under certain scenario's. 
Not only - and contrary to how it is presented by the Commission - does the 
Privacy Shield fail to solve this with the limitations it contains in terms of 'ac-
cess and use', these limitations are inherently flawed as well, as they do not 
comply with nor mirror the (EU) requirements of strict necessity and propor-
tionality.       
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 Continued bulk or indiscriminate collection and processing  
In itself65 it is gratifying that under PPD-28 (the Presidential Policy Directive 
28 of 17 January 2014)66 intelligence operations concerning sigint (signals 
intelligence, or the interception of electronic communication) will from now 
on only be allowed for purposes of foreign or counter-intelligence in support 
of government missions, and no longer with a view to benefit US companies' 
commercial interests. Sigint for industrial espionage, or to allow US compa-
nies to poach orders from European counterparts - which, as it turned out, 
happened inter alia with Echelon - has now been prohibited.  
As far as diversions go, this is a big one. Following the Schrems judgment, this 
is evidently no longer the issue. The real question is whether the limitations 
on data collection for government purposes in the fields of national security, 
public interest (other than for economic motives or to gain a competitive ad-
vantage) or law enforcement are convincing enough. The reality is they are 
not, regardless of the Commission's attempts to mask this. Yet, on the other 
hand, what we do get is an abundance of vague engagements on behalf of the 
US. The following is an anthology:     
Data collection under PPD-28 shall always be 'as tailored as feasible'67, and 
members of the intelligence community 'should require that, wherever prac-
ticable, collection should be focused on specific foreign intelligence targets or 
topics through the use of discriminants (eg specific  facilities,  selection  terms  
and  identifiers') 68. There is a little too much of 'should' in this sentence for it 
to be genuinely convincing. Also, 'wherever practicable' is both very condi-
tional and open-ended, and the mere use of 'discriminants' evidently does not 
guarantee compliance with strict necessity and proportionality require-
ments. At the very most, they imply that bulk collection will not take place 
without at least some form of selection. Furthermore, the US engagements 
coming from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) recog-
nise without much ado that bulk-sigint under 'certain' circumstances (that 
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rective/PPD-28, 17 January 2014 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office 
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EYES WIDE SHUT 
65 
 
are not very 'certain' to begin with, ‘for instance in order to identify and as-
sess new or emerging threats')69 will still take place. The Commission on its 
part apparently considers it sufficiently reassuring that this may only take 
place when targeted collection through the use of discriminants is not 
deemed feasible 'due to technical or operational reasons'. The recognition by 
the Commission (dexterously stashed away in footnote 71) that the feasibility 
report, which was supposed to be presented to former President Obama by 
the Director of National Intelligence with reference to the possibility of devel-
oping software that would make it easier for the intelligence community to 
'rather conduct targeted instead of bulk-collection' [emphasis added], con-
cluded that there is no software-based alternative to replace bulk-collection 
entirely, apparently does not contradict this reasoning. On the contrary, the 
Commission smoothly falls in with the ODNI's own estimation that bulk col-
lection will not be the rule (rather than the exception)70 - as if that would be 
sufficient in light of the EU requirements in terms of collection. Similarly com-
forting to the Commission is that the assessment of when a more targeted 
collection would be deemed technically or operationally 'not feasible', is not 
left to the individual discretion of individual staff of the intelligence commu-
nity.71 Now that really would have been quite wrong. In addition, the Com-
mission sees an extra 'safeguard' in the fact that the potential 'discriminants' 
shall be determined by high-level policy makers, and that they will be 
(re)evaluated on a regular basis.72 Ultimately, the Commission seems fully 
convinced when the ODNI-engagements make it clear that bulk-sigint use will 
- in any case - remain 'limited' to a list of six 'specific' national security pur-
poses (cf. below, under c.). Limitations to the phase of 'use' do not, however, 
imply safeguards to the phase of 'collection'. This is rather basic in EU privacy 
law. To sum it up in the Commission's own view, the conclusion is that 'alt-
hough not phrased in those legal terms', there is compliance with the EU re-
quirements of necessity and proportionality73: bulk-collection needs to re-
main the exception rather than the rule, and should it nevertheless take place, 
the six 'strict' limitations for use are applicable. Rephrased in non-misleading 
terms: bulk-collection remains possible, so that it is by no means compliant 
with the tight restrictions of EU privacy law in terms of data collection. 
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The above argumentation is also prominently featuring in the actions for an-
nulment of the Commission’s Privacy Shield adequacy decision brought in the 
fall of 2016 by Digital Rights Ireland respectively La Quadrature du Net and 
Others. The 4th plea in law relied on by Digital Rights Ireland alleges that the 
provisions of the FISA Amendments Act ‘constitute legislation permitting 
public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of elec-
tronic communications and consequently are not concordant with Article 7 
of the Charter […]’74. The generalised nature of collections allowed under the 
US regulatory regime is also the core element underlying the 1st plea in law 
put forward by La Quadrature du Net and Others,75 leading them to conclude 
that the adequacy decision infringes article 7 of the Charter by not drawing 
the conclusion that such ‘access on a generalised basis to the content of elec-
tronic communications’ compromises the essence of the fundamental right to 
respect for private life. The plea in law draws on several paragraphs of the 
revised decision itself:  ‘[…] PPD-28 explains that Intelligence Community el-
ements must sometimes collect bulk signals intelligence in certain circum-
stances, for instance in order to identify and assess new or emerging threats 
[…]’76; ‘According to the representations from the ODNI, even where the Intel-
ligence Community cannot use specific identifiers to target collection, it will 
seek to narrow the collection ‘as much as possible’ […]’77; ‘[…] Targeted col-
lection is clearly prioritised, while bulk collection is limited to (exceptional) 
situations where targeted collection is not possible for technical or opera-
tional reasons. […]’78.   
To the extent necessary, also the Irish High Court, in its judgment of 3 October 
201779, unambiguously established that ‘[o]n the basis of [the] definition [in 
Directive 95/46] and the evidence in relation to the operation of the PRISM 
and Upstream programmes authorised under s. 702 of FISA, it is clear that 
there is mass indiscriminate processing of data by the Unites States govern-
ment agencies, whether this is described as mass or targeted surveillance’. 
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Even if, for Upstream, it may well be the case that ‘mass searching […] is for 
targeted communications and […] in that sense not indiscriminate, […] it in-
volves the collection of non-relevant data […]’, so the Court held, thereby con-
firming the essential difference between ‘bulk searching’ v ‘bulk acquisition, 
collection or retention’80. 
 Access and use beyond strict necessity and proportionality 
The six 'specific' national security purposes (mentioned above) to which the 
bulk-sigint use will be 'limited' according to the ODNI-engagements are the 
following81: 'detecting and countering certain activities of foreign powers, 
counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, cybersecurity, detecting and coun-
tering threats to US or allied armed forces, and combating transnational crim-
inal threats, including sanctions evasion'. Downright optimistic is he who can 
discern the specificity hereof. No wonder that La Quadrature du Net and Oth-
ers, in their action of 25 October 2016 for annulment of the Commission’s ad-
equacy decision, build their 2nd plea in law on it, alleging that the ‘six national 
security purposes […] cannot be considered as [an] objective criterion allow-
ing a limitation to “purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable 
of justifying the interference”’. 
Moreover, it remains an arduous task to assess these purposes überhaupt in 
the sense of 'restrictions', let alone that they would be convincing in light of 
the EU requirements in this field as operationalised in the CJEU's Data Reten-
tion judgment. Nevertheless, the Commission appears to see such considera-
tions as nit-picking. In its adequacy decision, the Commission even attempts 
to embellish all of this82 by not mentioning the six vague purposes by name, 
but by adducing their potential to detect and counter threats stemming from 
espionage, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, threats to cyber-security, 
to the armed forces or military personnel, or in the context of transnational 
criminal threats to any of the other purposes. Such a misrepresentation is 
without honour. What we should be able to expect from the European Com-
mission is that it protects the privacy of the European citizen and that it will 
inform the latter (via its communication and (draft) adequacy decision) in a 
clear and correct way, not that the Commission contemptuously approaches 
EU citizens with hollow and US-friendly rhetoric whilst continuing to give 
away their privacy via bulk-collection in order to facilitate almost any US-in-
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telligence purpose. As if all of this weren't enough already, the above men-
tioned use - 'limitations' will also be applicable to the collection of personal 
data that runs through trans-Atlantic submarine cables – located outside of 
US territory – and this – at least according to the Commission – is the icing on 
the cake in terms of reassurance.83 Just for completion,  for this specific type 
of data, collection is not liable for a request conformant to FISA-legislation or 
through a so-called National Security Letter  of the FBI. Such a request - ac-
centuated by the Commission - will be mandatory when the intelligence com-
munity wishes to retrieve information from companies on US territory that 
are 'self-certified' under the new Privacy Shield.84  
This type of 'access' - and for that matter, a relief that for once this term is 
utilised in its proper, genuine meaning - would continuously need to be spe-
cific and limited, as it would require specific terms of selection or criteria. The 
fact that this would (even) be applicable to the PRISM-programme is consid-
ered a real windfall, at least by the Commission: this information is after all 
selected on the basis of individual selection criteria such as e-mail addresses 
and telephone numbers, and not through keywords or names of individuals.85 
As the Commission itself cannot resist emphasising, according to the Civil Lib-
erties Oversight Board this would mean that in the US, when necessary, it 
would exclusively concern 'targeting specific [non-U.S.] persons about whom 
an individualised determination has been made'. Footnote 87 clarifies that 
the continuation of unleashing PRISM on US companies under the Privacy 
Shield will therefore not entail the undirected (unspecific) collection of data 
on a large scale. As you like it. PRISM apparently is not a programme for the 
collection of data on a large scale, or it is (at least) sufficiently selective to pass 
the test of European privacy law. It seems the Commission itself was mistaken 
when, at the end of November 2013, it claimed in its Safe Harbour communi-
cation that 'the large scale character of these programmes [...] [could] have as 
a consequence that, of all the data that was transferred in the framework of 
the safe harbour, more than was strictly necessary for, or proportionate to, 
the protection of national security, was consulted and further processed by 
the American authorities, as was determined by the exception foreseen in the 
Safe Harbour decision.' Moreover, as the Commission is so eager to allege, 
there is empirical evidence that the number of targets affected through PRISM 
on a yearly basis is 'relatively small compared to the overall flow of data on 
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the internet'.86 The source for this statement is the 2014 annual report of the 
ODSI itself, hence it indeed appears that the PRISM-authorisation under FISA 
was applicable 'only' to 93.000 targets. Thus, nothing too large-scale for the 
Commission. Add to this the ODSI-warranty (in annex VI to the adequacy de-
cision) that the bulk-collection only takes place on a 'small proportion of the 
internet', this including the capturing of data on the trans-Atlantic cables87, 
and finally, everyone is convinced. Finally, what is added are a number of nu-
gatory additional guarantees in the following paragraphs88 such as, for in-
stance, that it is insufficient that sigint was collected over the course of the 
'routine activities of a foreign person' to spread it or to retain it permanently 
without there being other intelligence-based reasons for this.89 EU citizens 
may rest assured: electronic communication regarding their day-to-day rou-
tines will not be retained permanently when there are no well-founded rea-
sons to do so. All of this leads the Commission to conclude90 that, in the US, 
there are ample rules in place specifically designed to ensure that 'any inter-
ference for purposes of national security with the fundamental rights of the 
persons whose personal data are transferred […] under the EU-US Privacy 
Shield [is limited] to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objec-
tive in question' [emphasis added]. And with this alone the European citizen 
will have to make do. Those who thought that, following the Schrems judg-
ment, there would be a real issue with the commercial transfers of personal 
data to the US simply because the companies on its territory had to run this 
data through the PRISM-filter were sorely mistaken. The CJEU based the in-
validity of the Safe Harbour decision of the Commission on the techno-legal 
establishment that the latter had omitted to include in its decision that 'it 
must find, duly stating reasons, that the third country concerned in fact en-
sures, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, a level 
of protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that guaranteed 
in the EU legal order, a level that is apparent in particular from the preceding 
paragraphs of the present judgment'.91 In essence, the CJEU herewith refers 
to the substantive criteria of the Data Retention judgment. The European 
Commission's failure to mention 'that the United States in fact ‘ensures’ an 
adequate level of protection by reason of its domestic law or its international 
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commitments'92 was enough for the Court to decide on a techno-legal break-
point, 'without there being any need to examine the content of the safe har-
bour principles'.93 Unfortunately, this (and only this) seems to be precisely 
what the European Commission remembers from the Schrems judgment, and 
is the (sole) reason why the Commission seems convinced that its reasoned 
ascertainment of the adequate safeguards in the US' privacy regime will suf-
fice. While the reasoning aspect of this ascertainment is not open to question, 
the adequacy hereof is very equivocal - yet this was surely one of the Schrems 
judgment's demands. In brief, the presented argumentation is selective, often 
misleading, sometimes plain bogus. And last but not least, any effort to intro-
duce a profound scrutiny based on the criteria established in the Data Reten-
tion judgment was omitted by the Commission, contrary to the CJEU Schrems 
judgment that specifically referred hereto. 
 DATA COLLECTION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OR PUBLIC  
INTEREST PURPOSES 
In its adequacy decision, the Commission also evaluates the data protection-
relevant limitations and safeguards afforded by US law within the law en-
forcement sphere. At the risk of sounding redundant, very much like all of the 
foregoing, the Commission's conclusion, un-surprisingly, is that the US data 
protection level is to be considered adequate.94 Search and seizure by law en-
forcement authorities principally requires, according to the 4th amendment, 
a prior court order based on 'probable cause'. In certain circumstances, how-
ever, the 4th amendment is not applicable because for some forms of elec-
tronic communication there are no legitimate privacy expectations. In such 
an event, a court order is not mandatory, and law enforcement may revert to 
a 'reasonability test'. The latter simply implies that a consideration is made 
between the level of infringement of an investigative measure with respect to 
an individual's privacy and the extent to which that measure is deemed nec-
essary in function of legitimate government purposes like law enforcement 
(or another public interest). For the European Commission, this suffices to 
conclude that this 'captures the idea’ of necessity and proportionality under 
EU law.95 The cold fact that the 4th amendment is quite simply not applicable 
to non-US citizens outside of US territory does not change the Commission's 
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viewpoint. The reasoning is that EU citizens would receive and enjoy the in-
direct protection that US companies - where their data is being stored - enjoy. 
The establishment that such a protection can be bypassed fairly easily via a 
simple reasonability test, and that the privacy of a company is not automati-
cally at stake when law enforcement is after the private data of a user (only), 
is conveniently not addressed. According to the Commission, there are fur-
thermore additional protective mechanisms, such as directives of the minis-
try of justice that allow law enforcement access to private data only on 
grounds that are labelled by the Commission as 'equivalent' to the necessity 
and proportionality requirement: these directives after all stipulate that the 
FBI must take recourse to the least intrusive measure.96 That such a principle 
only addresses the subsidiarity of applying certain investigative measures, in-
stead of dealing with their necessity or proportionality will probably be con-
sidered as nit-picking again. Finally, the Commission deals with the practice 
of administrative subpoenas (as issued at the time against the SWIFT US-
hub). These are, as can be read, allowed only in particular circumstances and 
are subject to an independent judicial appraisal. What remains underempha-
sized - perhaps not to spoil the fun - is that the latter is only a possibility when 
a company refuses to spontaneously give effect to an administrative sub-
poena, thus forcing the government to have recourse to a judge for effecting 
said subpoena.  
Likewise, when administrative subpoenas are issued in the public interest, 
similar limitations 97  are applicable. After all, administrations are only al-
lowed to order access to data that is deemed relevant for matters under their 
competence - who would have thought any different? - and of course need to 
pass through the aforementioned reasonability test. All the more reason for 
the Commission, without wasting any more words on the matter, to promptly 
come to a conclusion98 similar to the one on the collection of data in view of 
national security. As it is seemingly evidently stated, the US has rules in place 
that are specifically designed so that 'any interference for law enforcement or 
other public interest purposes with the fundamental rights of the persons 
whose personal data are transferred [will be limited] to what is strictly nec-
essary to achieve the legitimate purpose in question' and that ensure ‘effec-
tive legal protection against such interference'. 
                                                                  
96 ibid, para 127. 
97 ibid, para 129. 




The failure to safeguard against indiscriminate access to electronic commu-
nications by US law enforcement authorities has also been picked up by Dig-
ital Rights Ireland in its action of 16 September 2016 for annulment of the 
Privacy Shield adequacy decision. Its 8th plea in law alleges that, based on this 
very argument, the decision is invalid as a breach of the rights of privacy, data 
protection, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, 
as provided for under the Charter and by the general principles of EU Law.  
 CONCLUSION 
The Privacy Shield is all the added value of a scrap of paper – insufficient, 
lacking credibility, misleading – and nothing but a new jackstraw for the pre-
vious Safe Harbour approach. None of the US harbours have become safer, 
PRISM and the likes remain on track. The Commission has nevertheless gone 
through great lengths to set forth why all of us should believe that the 'limita-
tions' and 'safeguards' available under US law are in line with the EU require-
ments of strict necessity and proportionality. The 2015 Schrems judgment, 
apparently, hasn’t changed anything.  
Luckily, it seems a matter of time only before the CJEU, in line with the latter 
decision, building on its 2014 Data Retention and 2016 Tele2 Sverige AB judg-
ments, and following the actions for annulment brought in the fall 2016 by 
Digital Rights Ireland respectively La Quadrature du Net and Others, rein-
forced by the Irish High Court’s recent judgment in Data Protection Commis-
sioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems, invalidates the Pri-
vacy Shield and annuls the Commission’s corresponding adequacy decision. 
In doing so, it will show that EU data protection standards are not up for 
grabs, neither in the trans-Atlantic relations nor in the EU’s future relations 
with key trading partners in East and South-East Asia and with countries in 
Latin America and the European neighbourhood, which the Commission will 
negotiate or is negotiating similar ‘shields’ with,99 like Japan.100  
Likewise, the EU and data protection authorities, intelligence and law en-
forcement oversight bodies and courts throughout the EU should draw les-
sons on the internal level. They must in particular see to it that, irrespective 
of later access or use restrictions, preventative data retention or collection 
                                                                  
99 Commission (EC), ‘Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World’ 
(Communication) COM(2017) 7 final, 10 January 2017. 
100 Commission (EC), ‘Joint statement by Commissioner Věra Jourová and Haruhi Ku-
mazawa, Commissioner of the Personal Information Protection Commission of Japan 
on the state of play of the dialogue on data protection’ (Joint Statement), 4 July 2017.  
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for protecting internal security or crime fighting is sufficiently selective, not 
only with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of com-
munication affected and the retention period adopted, but also with respect 
to the persons concerned and the public affected.  
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